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ABSTRACT
The recent debate  on  am biguity provides lessons for future arms control verif ication. 
Am erican officials sought verification systems that returned unambiguous evidence about
Soviet compliance, but a simple model of verification suggests that a verification scheme can be
more am biguous yet better.  It may be m ore effective in deterring violations and avoiding false
alarm s.  The reason  is as follows: should  the inspecting party com e upon su spicious evidence, it
will, on  the one hand , have a  reason  to trust tha t evidence  more, as it was returned by a m ore
reliable verification system.  On the other hand it will have a reason to be more sceptical that
the other is violating since the other would probably not dare to cheat in the face of the
improved verification technology.  In some situations a reasonable inspector will regard the
second factor as w eigh tier than the first, and give low er credence to the ev idence.   
Am biguity in verification is a tricky notion and misunderstandings about it arise from
two sources: from  the vocabulary o f verification, which  suggests that one dichotom ously
"detects" or does "not detect" violation, when in fact evidence comes in gradations, and from
the human tendency not to look at the situation from the other's viewpoint.  The model uses
game theory's logic to represent the strategic aspects of the situation, and has a mathematical
feature different from p ast models, the notion of continuous degrees of evidence, to give a
proper account of ambiguity.  It also clarifies past technical studies of verification by locating
them within the m odel's structure.  
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1     1 "Ambiguity" here means uncertainty about objective facts of compliance due to an
imperfect detection system, rather than semantic fuzziness in the treaty language.  When
the agreement presents a dichotomy such as compliance or non-compliance, ambiguity
is maximum when a treaty partner holds a 50/50 likelihood.
     2 President Reagan's Report to Congress on Compliance, Feb. 1, 1985, stated "In order
for arms control to have meaning . . . it is essential that all parties to agreements fully
comply with them.  Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is
fundamental and this Administration will not accept anything less." 
INTRODUCTION
In th e ve rification con text, ambiguity means one treaty partner's uncertain ty ab out the other's
compliance.1  During the 1980s Reagan Adm inistration officials and advisers asserted that a verification system
that leaves ambiguity will undermine arms control.  In 1981, Eugene Rostow, then Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, explained the Reagan Administration's new emphasis, "We will seek verification
provisions which . . . limit the likelihood of ambiguous situations developing.  Ambiguity can never be eliminated
but w e shall do our best to keep it to a m inim um . (Rostow, 1981; quoted by  Schear, 1982)."  The report
Discriminate Deterrence, from the President's Comm ission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1987), called for
agreements "capable of yielding evidence, in the event of a major violation, that will be sufficiently unambiguous
to enable the U.S. Government to decide on an adequate response."  The context of arms control has changed
since then, but ambiguity is  st il l an unsett led problem, l ikely to reappear.  The poli tical climate is warmer now,
but may change.  Mem bers of the Reagan Adm inistration group that objected to "ambiguity," whom Schear
(1989) termed the verification "revisionists," hold some key positions in Bush's arms control bureaucracy, and
agreem ents m ay come under general a ttack.   
It makes sense to clarify this past debate.  Specialists in verification technology see some hard obstacles
for future treaties, which may aggravate the problem of ambiguity.  Past treaties have tended to focus on weapons
that were easiest to verify, leaving, for example, sea-launched cruise missiles for later.  The type of problems that
might arise may be foreshadowed by some difficulties with the INF Treaty.  In one instance, U.S. sources worried
that Soviet declared inventory did not match CIA records of production (Geertz, 1990).  In another case, Soviet
missiles were apparen tly sighted  outside their lega l deploym ent area (1990).  These  verification am biguities a re
more  likely as verification becom es m ore  tho rough and extends over m ore  weapons. 
Calling for effective ly no am biguity in  a verifica tion system  is a strict dem and .  Curren t technology
cannot guarantee certainty for any of the agreements now being contemplated, and improvements in verification
technology are often cancelled by weapons developments.  If somehow verification methods gained a lead, the
two sides m ight use  up m uch  of the  advance by signing wider treaties, with the result that con fidence in
compliance would still be incomplete.  Com bined with a further position of some officials that all sections of an
agreement are important in themselves2, the call to eliminate ambiguity is an attractive slogan that opponents of
arms control cou ld use to block worthwhile agreem ents.
If we try to analyze the am biguity debate, we note that prop onents of  minim al am biguity have lef t a
num ber of issues unclea r.  Does the overall tho roughness o f a verifica tion system  reduce am biguity, or is
ambiguity determ ined by  som e other feature?   Director Rostow 's statement went on to suggest that more intense
verification was the answer, but a paradox is lurking here.  A m ore sensitive test might pick up smaller events that
would previously have been ignored, a point raised by Meyer (1984).  For example, originally one side might
2     3 One exception is Meyer (1984). See also Katz (1980).
have accused the other of having too many missiles, but with better surveillance, it complains about the details of
the missi les.  Old ambiguities would be replaced by new ones, and i t is not clear that uncertainty would go down
overall.  In this example, the better scheme shifts the ambiguity to the finer details, and so to the less important
parts of the trea ty.  If this were the only problem surrounding am biguity, the  practical issue w ould  be se ttled --
ambiguity would be unequivocally bad and correctable by more extensive verification.  However, as this paper
will show, even when com paring two verification systems for a given provision of the treaty, the better
verification may yield m ore amb iguity.
Defining "better" requires some care, since the performance of verification is not purely technical, but
depends in part on a hum an decision , the inspecting governm ent's judgement about how much  evidence  it will
require before it accuses.  In a context involving simple violate/comply, accuse/not accuse decisions, one can
define a system  B as better than  A, if, for any policy the user adopted with A, B would allow the user to adopt
some policy that both increases the likelihood of an accusation given the other is guilty, and lowers the likelihood
of a accusation given the other is innocent.  It is easy to show that a more thorough system, that is, one that
collec ts al l the  original inform ation plus  som e m ore , is alw ays be tter in th is sense.  
This paper will show that low ambiguity is not always desirable.  It gives a formal m odel that clarifies
the difference between a unambiguous verification system and a good one, and allows this difference to be made
intuitive.  It yields an example in which the u ser has a cho ice of two  verification system s, and wisely p refers a
system  tha t would lead to m ore  uncertain ty when the ev idence suggests that the other has vio lated the agreement. 
During successive arms control negotiations, the Kennedy, Nixon and Carter administrations set the desideratum
for verification provisions tha t they al low  a tim ely response to  any m ilitarily s ignificant cheating (Krepon , 1985). 
This definition of quality correctly focused on the benefits of the consequences, and I w ill argue tha t the em phasis
initiated during the R eagan administration on the insp ecting governm ent's mental state, its degree of uncertainty,
is off track. 
To sum marize why low amb iguity is not per se desirable, if a government refines its verification system,
and the other side knows of this improvement, the latter will generally be less inclined to violate.  The observing
government will indeed know that the other is less likely to violate.  If the verification scheme returns evidence
suggesting guilt, the inspecting government has to weigh this evidence against the implausibility that the other
really would violate, "Wou ld they dare do such a thing in the face of our better verification?"  In certain cases, as
the m ode l will show, an  obse rving governm ent w ill attribute the possible ev idence of  guilt to the  vagaries o f its
verification system, and decide that the prior expectation of innocence outweighs the evidence of guilt.  The
government will be sensible to do this.  It will be less sure of a violation under the better system, and hold a
likelihood of the other's guilt that is closer to 50/50.  The observing governmen t is confident of the higher
deterrent power of the better test; its greater uncertainty stems from a positive quality of the improved system, not
a weakness.  
The role o f am biguity in  verification has seldom been  discussed, even inform ally3, in part, I believe,
because two barriers hinder reasoning and talking about it.  The first, termed here "myopic thinking," involves
ignoring that the other side will behave differently in response to changes in your system, and that indeed you
yourself will behave differently in expectation of their altered responses.  Myopic thinking ignores that the other
3side is an  aware calculating entity, and  is related to  the "fa llacy of the last m ove" (York, 1970), so common in
strategic an alysis.  
The second m isconception involves the language typica lly used  to analyze verification -- I will ca ll it
"detection-talk" -- which gives the impression that evidence of a violation comes back as a dichotomous
"Violation!" or "No violation!" when in fact confirmation is usually a matter of degree.  Analysts talk of
"dete rmining" com pliance, "de tecting"  a viola tion, or "catching" the o ther cheating, and even the  term
"verification" itself suggests a clear finding on the truth.  Perhaps these words were chosen to convince rather
than to describe, but in im portant ways they are m isleading.  Detection-talk ignores the imp ortance o f false
alarm s, since it suggests that the on ly fault o f a system  is failure to  "detect" a vio lation.  If vio lations  were simply
detected or not detected, one could forego any discussion of ambiguity in verification, and this is in fact what one
sees in the  literature.  
Two form al techniques will correct each of these misconceptions.  Myopic thinking will be avoided
through gam e theo ry.  A gam e m ode l will calculate how the observe r's assessed p robability of a  violation sho uld
change with a new verification system.  Detection talk will be replaced by a conception of gradual evidence,
explicated by "identification curves."  The curve for a given system states its tradeoff between false alarms and
correct accusations.  So far their arms control applications have been mainly in the subculture of the
seismological discrimination of nuclear explosions (Dahlmann, 1977; Fetter, 1988), but they can clarify puzzles
in many other types of arms agreements since they neatly summ arize all the decision-relevant properties of
verification systems involving choices that are d ichotomous (cheat or not, accuse or no t).  
Game theo ry and  identification  curves are two essentially m athem atical techniques, and deriving certa in
results w ill require some form alism .  How ever, the  assum ptions and  conclusions be low will alw ays be restated  in
words, and the logic leading to the conclusions is understandable without mathematics.  Paraphrasing
Wittgenstein, the attitude is that mathematics is a ladder that helps us ascend to a level of understanding.  Having
clim bed it w e can th row  it down behind  us.  
The  model can  clarify some other puzzles.  One can prove that better systems som etimes increase
"ambivalence," which refers to a situation where what to do is unclear, as opposed to "ambiguity" which implies
uncertainty abou t what to believe.  Also, better systems sometimes increase the likelihood of a violation, but the
observing government prefers them nevertheless.  A third result that is intuitive but not trivial, is that increasing
the d ifficulty o f cheating low ers its likelihood.  In addition the  mode l can o rganize  past research -- the  append ix
gives a su rvey of technical research  on verification and how it relates to the  politica l decisions of  whether to
comply and whether to accuse.
The Influence of Ambiguity on the Decision to Accuse 
Freeing ourse lves from  detec tion-talk  lets us ask  how  uncertainty in teracts w ith other considerations in
the com pliance and accusation dec isions.  Am biguity com plicates the dec ision in several ways, which  I first
describe informally and later express in the model.  First and most straightforward, the partial nature of evidence
generates a d iscussion on  just how strong the  evidence  really is.  This was exem plified  by the  recen t U.S. debate
on  Soviet compliance, sum marized later in the  Conclusions sec tion.  
Second, even if the Reagan Administration and arms control advocates had been of one mind on the
degree  of evidence, an other factor might have led  them to d isagree  wh ether the Soviet U nion w as com plying. 
That is, even though two groups come to opposite conclusions on the same evidence, they might both be thinking
4rationally.  The reason is a simple fact of probability assessments: one's final beliefs should depend in part on
one's prior beliefs before exam ining the im mediate evidence.  In the verification context the dec ision to accuse
should ref lect no t only the degree of in telligence information  poin ting to guilt, but also the observer's previously
held likelihood that the other side would violate the treaty.  The influence of previous beliefs, of general
information, as I will call it here, is not an irrational prejudice or stubbornness, since the beliefs may be based on
real experience about the other's goals and political culture.  (These ideas have been discussed by Jervis, 1976,
and  Meyer, 1984.) 
Just how one 's conclusion sh ould  depend  on p rior expectations of  a viola tion, can be  stated in  a simple
formula.  We wan t to assess this probability:
P1: Probability that the other violated based on information from verification, as well as on our general
inform ation about th e other.  
This probability P1 can  be ca lculated by  using: 
P2/P3: Probability P2 in this ratio is the likelihood that we would be getting this evidence from our
verification system, based on the premise that the other violated.  It is divided by P3, the probability of
observing th is evidence  conditioned on the  other's not having viola ted.  (Bo th probab ilities will require
us to consider ou r genera l inform ation .) 
and 
P4 : Our p rior probability that the other would v iolate , i.e., that based only  on  our general inform ation.  
Elem entary  probability theory (e .g., Feller, 1960), gives this form ula fo r P1: 
Analyses purely of the verification scheme supply P2/P3 since they follow the lines: If the other side
were violating what would our intelligence show, compared to the picture if the other side were complying?  The
ratio P2/P3, called the likelihood ra tio, can  be regarded as the strength of evidence fro m the  verification system. 
However, a crucial variable is P4, our expectation of a violation based on our prior political and social views and
not conditioned on the immediate evidence.  An analyst who has always been convinced that the other side
wishes to keep the treaty will be relatively reticent about concluding guilt, while one who distrusts the other
anyway will take very low evidence as sufficient.  Each is being consistent.  If the verification system had sent
back decisive evidence, the resulting probability P1 of a violation would be 0 or 1, but otherwise parties' prior
attitudes should  inf luence their conclusions. 
    The decision to accuse should also reflect the observer's costs or benefits for the possible outcomes.  For
exam ple, a governm ent that regards  the treaty 's advantages as sm all and  violations as dangerous w ill be m ore
ready to accuse.  The simplest case involves four values attached to each of the four outcomes (cheat and accuse,
cheat and  not accuse, etc.)  Accord ing to stan dard  decision analysis, one should accuse when  P1 x V1  + (1-P1) x
V2 > P1  x V3 + (1-P1) x V4.  Here the notation  for one's values is 
    V1: making an accusation when the other has violated,
    V2: making an accusation when the other has complied,
    V3: not making an accusation when the other has violated,
    V4: not making an accusation when the other has complied.
5    
Strategic versus Myopic Thinking in the Decision to Accuse
In summ ary the following factors are important for a government deciding whether to accuse: its prior
expectations, P4; the strength of evidence returned by the verification scheme P2/P3; and the values the
goverment attaches to different outcomes, V1  to V4.  From  the description above it seem s simple in  princip le to
calcu late P1 from  P4 and  P2/P3, estimate V1 to V 4, app ly the fo rmula and then act.  The problem, however, is
that all the  factors are entangled .  They  cann ot be  considered  independen tly because  the two decision-makers
kn ow each other's outlooks , and know that their in terests are in  partia l opposition.  The verification system 's
quality, for example, influences the decision of the other to violate and thus our prior probability of a violation
(we know that the other is aware of that quality.)  If the governments tried to decide by this usual
cost/benefit/likelihood approach there would be no p lace to  start.  
Som e of these circular influences can be seen in Figure 1.  The decisions of both parties lie in sequences
of arrows that form closed loops, meaning that the governments cannot expect to judge some set of quantities as
exogenously given, and  make a decision resting conten t with these original assessmen ts.  Circularities like these




A FORMAL MODEL OF OBSERVING AND ACCUSING
The m odel's purpose is to give insight into the structure of verification decisions, and to state a
framework for abstract reasoning.  It is not to generate numerical predictions.  The model sho uld be just
complicated  enough to le t us  formula te so me signif icant d ilem mas w ithin its structure, but no m ore  so than that. 
Accordingly, it is one-sided in that only one governmen t observes and judges, while only the other chooses
whether or not to violate.  That is, the observer does not have the option of violating.  Another assumption is that
each party makes a dichotomous decision: the inspectee cannot for example "partially" violate the treaty, nor
select among several types of violations, and the observer cannot choose among hedged accusations of different
strengths.  Also the model portrays the observer as looking at a single test, so the term "test" here should be taken
to m ean the en tire system of the  government's direct in telligence, its co mple te ensem ble  of verification m eans. 
The three parts of the model are then an imperfect observation system, a decision by the inspectee to violate or
no t, and decision by the observer to  accuse or no t.  Each of these w ill now  be described.  
    
Detection-talk Versus Identification Curves
Detection-talk suggests that verification evidence is typically cut and dry.  This usage caused no
problems when the Partial Test Ban was the major treaty in force and a violation would have been obvious, but
experience from the ABM  Treaty and SALT II has shown that verification is a matter of degree.  Much of the
recent debate in the United States was over factual claims about Soviet compliance.
Detection-talk is comm on even specialists in verification and has led them to adopt inadequate indices of
quality.  One measure has been a system's likelihood of "detecting" a violation given the other side has committed
one.  In 1979, for example, United States Secretary of Defense Harold Brown described the rating system in the
U.S. inte lligence  com munity .  Verifica tion that cou ld de tect viola tions w ith probab ility 90%  to 100%  were
termed "high confidence," with categories extending down to "low" (10% to 50%) and "very low" (0% to 10%)
confidence.  However, any approach involving only one number must be deficient because no single quantity can
6     4 The term comes from the seismological identification of nuclear explosions.  Dahlman (1977) and Fetter (1988) give examples.  Themethod seems to have originated in engineering, where the curve was known as the Receiver Operating Characteristic, and is used in a
several other fields such as the analysis of medical diagnoses and perception psychology.  
convey the informational value of a ll the possible shades of evidential strength  -- each b ody  of evidence would
require its own probability value.  Another inadequacy in the probability-of-detection approach is that one can
fudge a "perfect" detection scheme by adopting the policy of declaring a detection no matter how weak the
evidence is.  This would score a perfect record of no misses.  Of course, given innocence, the likelihood o f a
"false alarm" w ould be unity and the treaty would collapse.  Thus second fault of one-number
probability-o f-detection m ethods is that they ignore  the  false alarm  rate .   
What is a proper way to state a system's quality?  The description should be stated in an abstract way,
beyond the details of technical means of intelligence, for example, and the description should be independent of
the expectations  and  values of the  user?   In the abstract, the  user chooses the level of evidence required  befo re
accusing, then examines the evidence and accuses if it is higher, or does not accuse if it is lower.  The quality of
the verification system for that particular criterion of evidence is given by two num bers: the hit probability and
the false alarm probability.  The hit probability is the probability of an accusation when a violation has occurred,
and the false alarm  probability  is the probability of an accusation given no violation.  The user could change the
criterion for accusing to  require a m ore or less proo f (be a m ore cautious or aggressive, due  either to  chan ges in
prior expectations or values).  Demanding a higher level would reduce the false alarm probability, which is good,
but decrease the probability of a hit, which is bad.  To specify the informational quality of a detection system
independent of the observer's choice of threshold of evidence, one must graph the functional relationship between
the  two probabilities, to state how  the  they trade off against each other.  
Figure 2 is such a function, called the Identification Curve4.  The elegant feature of the identification
curve , the reason for our in terest in it, is that it is a pure and complete description of  test quality.  It conta ins all
one needs to know about the test to make a decision whether to accuse, but nothing more.  The other information
needed goes beyond the test: our prior likelihood of a violation, our values for the outcomes, and the evidence
actually observed.  The  curve reflects only  information about the test itself, in the sense that two observers may
have diffe rent estim ates of  the oppo nen t's disposition  to viola te, or different pe rceptions of  the costs of the ir






The test determines the identification curve as a whole, but the observer's prior probability (P4) and
values (V1 to V4) fix the particular point on the curve the observer is using.  The threshold of evidence that an
observer chooses based on expectations and attitudes, determines a point on the curve.  The coordinates of that
poin t are the false alarm and  hit probab ilities the ob server w ould  display wh en the evidence is just enough  to
trigger an accusation.  Someone who chooses a threshold at a point on the identification curve is said to be
operating at that point.  A  government w ith a low  prior expectation o f a viola tion and an attitude that m isses are
not as serious as false alarms, is operating at the lower left end of the curve and evincing a general tendency not
to  accuse.  Conversely, a government d isposed to  accuse  operates a t the upper right end.  Changing an observer's
7costs, benefits and prior expectations causes the best policy to move around to different positions on the curve,
but the curve itself does not change, since the latter depends only of the evidential qualities of the verification
system . 
For a given verification system, how would one derive its identification curve?  The answer depends on
the context.  In seismological detection, the curve can be constructed from data from real explosions and
earthquakes.  (Of course past detonations involved no attempt at concealment, so more realistic identification
curves would require a physica l model of the evasion technique .)  In areas such  as arms limitation agreem ents,
evidence comes from many sources, and sometimes is "soft," based on hum an judgement as well as technological
hardware.  One m ust assess the like lihood ratios that a given  policy generates, so the  actua l func tion is harder to
produce.  Some general techniques for teasing such judgements out of specialists are described by Spetzler and
Stael von  Holstein (1975), but it might be m ore realistic to regard the curves as too ls for clarifying concep ts,
rather than m aking real decisions.
Properties of Identification Curves
Only certain functions can be identification curves, and three necessary features are listed now.  Since an
observer has the options of never or always accusing, an  identification  curve  must start at (0,0) and end at (1,1 ). 
It should lie above the diagonal, since it should produce a higher probability of accusation when there is cheating
than  when there is none.  A less obvious property is that the curve's slope decreases moving to the right.  It can be
shown that the slope at the point determined by a certain threshold of evidence is the likelihood of this degree of
evidence given cheating, divided by the likelihood given non-cheating, i.e., the slope is the likelihood ratio P2/P3,
defined  earlier (Green and  Swets, 1966, p.38).  The explanation for the decreasing slope  is that if one requires less
evidence  of cheating a t the threshold for accusation , and then observes that exact am oun t of evidence, that should
mean that cheating is m ore likely .  Therefore m oving rightwards on  the identification curve should correspond  to
a decreasing like lihood ra tio, and thus a decreasing slope.  
A fu rther consequence is: If one curve lies entirely northwest of another, the former is a better test. 
"Better" was defined above as allowing one to choose an accusation policy that yields a lower false alarm and a
higher hit  rate .  A poin t on  the  better test  tha t lies  northwest of the  point chosen on  the  wo rse test  will satisfy  this . 
A worthless test would have the diagonal line as its identification curve, and lead the user to accuse with a
likelihood independent of the ev idence.  A perfect tes t, on the  other hand, would involve  a line starting at (0,0),
proceed ing vertically to the upper left corner (0,1) then ho rizontally to (1,1).  It would allow  the user to accu se
when and  only when there was cheating.  
The Observer's and Inspectee's Values 
The next step in constructing the model is to specify the goals of the two parties, that is, their degrees of
preference  for a continu ing agreement, successfu l chea ting, etc.  I assum ed verification  is one-way , so the actors
can be called the Observer and the Inspectee.  The O bserve r's values for the ou tcom es are deno ted as follow s:  
No  chea ting and no t accuse: t 
                      No cheating and accuse: w 
Cheating and accuse: y 
Cheating and not accuse: z . 
8It is assumed that t is greater than z and that w and y lie in between: t > w > z and t > y > z, i.e., that w or y, which
involve a b reakdow n of the agreement are  preferred  to z , a secret vio latio n.  
The values of the Inspectee are 
Cheat and no t be accused: A
Not cheat and not be accused: b 
Not chea t and  be accused: c
Cheat and  be accused: d. 
I assume that A is greater than d, that b and c lie between these two values: A > b > d and 
A > c > d.  These orderings show a perceived conflict of interest since the Observer's ideal outcome is not the
same as the Inspectee's.  Someone outside the distrust and rivalry of the two countries might object that the
Inspectee would gain more by complying than by cheating successfully, but these goals are evaluated are from the
participant's perspective, not necessarily objectively.  The purpose here is to analyze the Observer's decision, and
it seem s plausible that each pow er m ight see  the  other as m otivated  to cheat.  
What does each side know about the other's goals?  I assume that each knows everything, except that the
Observer is uncertain about the Inspectee's degree of motivation to cheat, A.  (Capitalizing A shows its special
status.)  The Inspectee is aw are of A  but the Observer has only a p robability d istribution H over it: the Observer's
probability that A  is lower than a given number a is  given by the va lue  H(a) of the function. 
There is a final quantity, P1, about which I make no assumptions. It is the Observer's prior expectation
that the other will cheat, and is determined within the model as a consequence of the game-theoretical assumption
that each is maximizing its gain, given its expectation of the other's behaviour.  This is a more realistic depiction
of the  Ob server's th inking, better than regard ing the  Inspectee as  a random  entity. 
The Course of Events in the Model
Events proceed  as follows: 
  1) th e Inspectee assesses A , its va lue  for successful cheating, 
  2) th e Inspectee decides w hether to cheat, 
  3) th e Observer calcula tes an evidence thresh old  above which it w ill accuse, 
  4) th e Observer examines the strength of evidence that the Inspectee is cheating, 
  5) th e Observer accuses o r does not accuse, 
  6) the two parties receive the values appropriate to the outcome.
Game-theoretical methods will determine a best strategy for each side.  What would a strategy look like? 
A strategy means as a complete plan of action telling what to do, perhaps as a function of something learned
during the p lay.  The Observer's must choose a leve l of evidence necessary to accuse.  Th is threshold has a
one-to-one relationship with the hit and false alarm probabilities, and the hit probability is itself a function of the
false ala rm probability (through the iden tification  curve  function  f).  Therefore one regard the O bserve r's strategy
as a false alarm probability x*.  
The possible strategies for the Inspectee are more complicated: the latter chooses whether to cheat or not
depending on the motivation A, so a strategy must specify a choice for every value of A, that is for all "types" of
Inspectees.  To simplify the task one can make a justifiable assumption that there is a cutoff value a* such an
Inspectee with a m otivation at or beyond the cu toff will ch eat, and one with lo wer m otivation w ill not. 
Specifying a single a* will give a rule for every type of Inspectee.  From  now on I will talk as if a* were the
Inspectee's "strategy,"  although m ore  precisely it is a  rule  for de term ining a  strategy .  
9     5 A single-indicator test is defined here as one that sends back just two states of evidence,
"guilty" and "innocent."  The indicator is probabilistically associated with a violation or
compliance, and is more likely to say "guilty" when a violation has occurred than when
one has not.  What will be the form of identification curve?   If one defines x =
Prob(Indicator says "guilty," given no violation) and y = Prob(Indicator says
"innocent," given a violation), the observer could choose a
threshold-of-evidence-for-accusing corresponding to hit probability x and false alarm
probability y, simply by accusing when and only when the indicator says "guilty."  It
follows that the identification curve will contain the point with horizontal coordinate x
and vertical coordinate y.  Alternatively the observer could choose to use the indicator
to operate at any point on the line segment joining (x,y) to (1,1) or the segment joining
it to (0,0).  For example, if the observer adopted the policy of always accusing if the
indicator says "guilty," and accusing with some random probability if it says
"innocent," then this would yield a false alarm and a hit probability lying on the straight
line joining (0,0) and (x,y), as in Figure 3.  Although unrealistic, single-indicator tests
are easy to handle mathematically, and are useful in proving claims that certain
phenomena can occur in principle.
The goal is then to  determ ine the pair a * and x* that results when each tries to maximize its benefits given
a sensible expectation o f the o ther's behaviou r.  The criterion of rationality used is an  equilibrium : an Observer's
x* and Inspectee 's a* are such that even if one party knew the other's choice, it would have no incentive to change its
own behaviour.  (The pair I calculate actually satisfies stronger criterion, they are strict and subgame perfect
equilibrium in that either side would be losing by deviating from the policy, and no one acts irrationally even at
positions in the game that have ze ro p robability of being reaching.)
To calculate x* and a* one writes an expression for the expected value to the Observer as a function of
the choice of threshold x, given that the other has selected a*, and choo ses x to m axim ize this express ion.  This
maximization is  expressed by set ting the derivative of the expression with respect  to x, equal to 0 at  the unknown
optimizing value, which is designated x*.  Likewise one writes an exp ression for the Inspectee's payoff as a
function  of a, given that the observer uses x*, and requires that cutoff motivation a* be  set to m aximize it.  These
operations yield a  pair of  nonlinear simultaneous equations, given in  Ap pendix 2 , in the tw o starred variables. 
The fo llowing examples were solved on a  computer using sim ple  approxim ation m ethods. 
How a Better Test can be More Ambiguous
Here I give an  exam ple to  show  that a better test can  som etimes induce  more am biguity.  It uses a single
indicator test, a single observation that simply signals "guilty" or "innocent" to show greater or lesser evidence of
guilt5.  One m ight ob ject tha t a real O bserver would be uncerta in about a ll four o f the other's values, no t jus t A. 
Introducing such  uncertainty w ould  involve slightly m ore complicated formulae but would  not change the basic
resu lts.  
After the Observer switches to a better indicator, when the indicator says "guilty," the Observer will be
less sure  that the  Inspectee has viola ted.  The results a re the p robabilities in Table 1 .  The Im proved Indicato r is
more likely to be correct than the Original Indicator whether there is a violation or not, and therefore it is indeed
better.  (If the o ther is guilty, it says  so with probab ility .76 rather than  .30; if innocent, it says tha t with
probability .90 rather than 80.)  The identification curves of the two tests are shown in Figure 3.  Substituting the
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formulae for these curves in the two non-linear equations of A ppendix 2, gives optim al solutions a* and x* for
each player for each function, as in Table 1.
  
))))))))))))))))))))))))) 
TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 3 HERE 
))))))))))))))))))))))))) 
With the Original Indicator, the Inspectee should cheat whenever motivation is greater than a* = .467,
thus has a probability .533 of cheating; the Observer should always accuse when the indicator says "guilty" and
accuse with probab ility .026 w hen  it says "inn ocent."  (This follow s from  calcu lating x* using the two nonlinear
equations in the Appendix applied to the identification curve of Figure 3.)  With the Improved Indicator the
Inspectee cheats when m otivation is greater than .884, giving probability .116 of cheating, and the Observer
should accuse w ith probability .617 when  the indicator says "guilty" and never accuse when it says "innocent." 
The point of the result here is that when the Observer sees a guilty indicator, its opinion is more definite with the
Original than  the Im proved (it ho lds probab ility .632 that the o ther is cheating ra ther than .500).  Although
Director Rostow advocated lower ambiguity, the Observer would experience greater ambiguity under the better
test: indeed it would then face the maximum  possible ambiguity, assessing a 50/50 likelihood that the other had
complied.  
Although  the new test yields greater am biguity, its sup eriority m anifests itself in a num ber of ways: there
will be less cheating (12% of the time versus 53% ); the Observer experiences lower am biguity (probability of a
violation is .03 versus .50) when the indicator says "innocent"; and most impo rtant, the Observer has a higher
expected benefit (.89 versus .73).  So the new test really is better, but "better" does not m ean "less ambiguous."  
The exp lanation is that the new tes t is so m uch  more tho rough  than  the o ld that the Observe r is very
confident before examining the evidence that the Inspectee will not cheat.  (The Observer has prior confidence
.884 for the new versus .467 for the old.  These are simply the values of a*, which equal the probabilities that the
Inspectee's motivation is below the threshold.)  Even though the Improved Indicator gives more informative
evidence, the Observer's revised opinion in the face of guilty evidence is still lower than with the Original
Indicator, because  the Observe r quite sensibly  does not sh ift far away from  the prior view  that cheating is
un like ly.  
CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODEL
How a better test can cause more ambivalence
The Com mission on Integra ted Long-T erm Strategy w orried abou t verification tha t makes it d ifficult to
decide how to act.  Th is concept, which I term  ambivalence, is slightly different from ambiguity in the following
way.  One's aversion to some outcomes might predispose one to accuse as long as the probability of a violation
were above some very low va lue.  In tha t situation  a 50/50 assessm ent w ould  leave full am biguity abou t what to
believe, but lo w am bivalence ab out how to act. 
The example of Table 1 illustrates that ambivalence can be higher under a better test.  When evidence
comes back from the poorer Original Indicator that suggests guilt, the decision is clear.  Not accusing achieves an
expectation of .132 versus accusing's expectation of 0.  (These are calculated by determining the equilibrium
strategies, which give, in turn, the probability of cheating, of seeing various strengths of evidence, and of
accusing.  One can then determine the likelihood of the four possible outcomes, and weight them by the proper
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probabilities and thus calculate expectations.)  With the Improved Indicator the expectation of both courses of
action is  0 in  the  face of guilty evidence.  The bette r test has generated m ore  am bivalence.  
How a better test can mean more cheating
The m odel sets up a paradigm situation in verification: one side deciding whether to cheat, the other
watching and weighing whether to accuse.  It provides a framework to clarify a number of other questions.  One
can ask, in part icular, whether a better  test might induce more cheating.  The answer is yes.  With the two
single-indicator tests and w ith values held  by the governments as given in Table 2, the im proved  indicator is a
better test, and Tables 1 and 2 show that the Inspectee's threshold motivation for cheating goes down in the
improved test, resulting in a rise in  the  probability o f cheating from .125 to  .143. 
)))))))))))))))))))))))))
TABLE 2 AND FIGURE 4 HERE
)))))))))))))))))))))))))
One can glean the explanation by examining what other strategies and beliefs result when the Observer
uses the new test.  The reasons behind the increase in cheating illustrate an interesting general point about
verification system: som e are esp ecially effective  when used by an observe r cautious in accusing, wh ile others are
better in  the hands of an  aggressive  obse rver.  A system  whose identifica tion curve is skewed to  the low er left is
rela tive ly useful to  a cautious ob server since its  quality  is high just in that region  wh ere the  observer w ill operate . 
It is one where much guilty evidence is necessary before the indicator signals "guilty," but should the indicator be
tripped, then the test is highly credible.  This type of scheme can be termed "sluggish."  On the other hand a
system with a curve skewed to the upper right would be acceptable to an aggressive observer since its poor
behaviour is confined to a area in the square the observer will not use, and one can term it a "hair-trigger" system.
 
An exam ple of m aking a system  better and m ore sluggish would be the following: the observer has a
seismic network that returns accurate evidence on the position, depth, and location of a seismic "event" along
with an imperfect "yes" or "no" indicator of whether it was a nuclear explosion.  A better test would be to add a
treaty provision for drilling for radioactivity at the site whenever the indicator shows "guilty."  This would give a
near-zero false alarm probability although the system might m iss some explosions.  Thus its identification curve
would be strongly skewed to the left.  
The Im proved Indicator in Figure 4 is especially sluggish, i.e., relatively more effective in the hands of a
cautious observe r.  Switch ing to the Improved Indicato r system  induces the  Observer to  beco me m ore cautious in
order to exploit the indicator's positive properties.  The Observer will be less likely to accuse falsely, at the slight
expense of the scheme's deterrent potential.  If evidence arrives that is just at the Observer's threshold of
accusation , the values of f(x *) and x* show that the optimal false alarm probability is reduced by .135 at a cost of
only  about .005  in the h it rate.  The  Inspectee w ill anticipa te the O bserve r's greater caution and will be slightly
more  willing to cheat.  It is in teresting that both  Ob server and  Inspectee prefer the Im proved Indicator to the  old .  
What happens when cheating becomes more costly?
A further question that the m odel can address involves the ef fec ts of increasing the  cost of cheating. 
Would we be more justified in believing cheating will occur, or less so?  The answer is not obvious -- sometimes
considerations that suggest innocence may just as plausibly imply guilt.  In 1979 an Am erican surveillance
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     6 For these six accusations the debate was primarily factual: whether new Soviet ABM
systems were mobile, whether the yields of underground tests exceeded the Threshold
Test Ban Treaty limit, whether certain Soviet Bear bombers were dismantled, whether
the "yellow rain" of Cambodia was Soviet-supplied toxins, whether chemical weapons
were used in Afghanistan, and whether the 1979 anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk
indicated a biological warfare facility there.  Two of the issues were mainly semantic: 
whether the ban on "rapid" reloading of ABM interceptors proscribes a new Soviet
system, and whether extensive encrypting of missile test telemetry "impedes"
verification.  Two further issues involved both factual and semantic uncertainties:
whether the SS-25 intercontinental missile carried too high a "throwweight" and
whether the SA-12 antiaircraft missile had ABM "potential."  Two issues cannot be
categorized as either semantic or evidential uncertainty: the first was the radar site then
under construction at Krasnoyarsk which both the Arms Control Association and the
Administration regarded as a violation, and the other was the concurrent operation of air
and ABM defenses where the validity of the Reagan Administration's charge depended
on the terms of a secret Soviet-American understanding.  
satellite recorded a light flash with a time course similar to a nuclear explosion (Walters and Zinn, 1985).  The
flash observed was consistent with a nuclear test in the Atlantic Ocean near Southern Africa and some
commentato rs suggested that the Republic o f So uth  Africa , or perhaps Israel, had exp loded a first weapon.  A
con trary argum ent w as that the ocean su rface a t that location would be especially rough, an  unlike ly place to
choose fo r a nuclear test.  But would  not the implausibility of th is site give a co ncealer m ore confidence that it
will not be accused?  Should it not support the case that a nuclear test occurred?  It is clear that our assessment of
the cost of cheating should alter our judgement, but unclear in which direction? 
I can incorporate  an increase in  the  cost of cheating by  altering the Inspectee 's payoffs to A +k and d+k. 
The constant k is negative, and represents the change in benefit to the cheater associated with cheating under new
circumstances, in the example, the added costs of testing on a rough ocean.  Caught or not, the cheater has to pay
that extra charge.  I can then examine how optimal behaviour changes with k.  The assumption here is that the
increased cost is given, not a strategic choice of the Inspectee.  Calculations given in Appendix 2 imply a general
conclusion, true fo r all identification  curves and  values for ou tcom es within the m ode l's assumptions: if an illicit
nuc lear test becom es m ore costly to condu ct, the Inspectee  will be  less likely to  chea t and  the Observe r will
demand m ore  evidence befo re accusing.  
CONCLUSIONS
One can judge the impact of ambiguous detection on the recent U.S. debate by looking at a list of
allegations of Soviet non-compliance.  A report from the Reagan Administration claimed twelve Soviet violations
or "likely" violations of agreements (Office of Press Secretary, the White House, 1987).  The Arms Control
Association, a pro-arms control public education group, released a counterdocument replying to each point
(1987), and together these are a precis of the debate.  Comparing the allegations and responses, one can classify
the issues as involving sem antic ambiguity in  the treaty  language, or fac tual am biguity, or both , or neither.  Fully
six points of difference center on factual ambiguity, two are semantic, two others are a combination of factual and
semantic, and in one instance both American parties saw a clear violation.6  Soviet accusations of U.S.
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     7 The Soviet press and television have emphasized these points (and others) that involve
factual questions about U.S. behaviour (dates refer to the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service Daily Report, Soviet Union; other references are given by Duffy,
1988, and Koulik, 1991): violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by supplying nuclear
materials to Israel (April 10, 1987); violation of the Biological Weapons Treaty (March
31, 1987); use of Minuteman missiles for antimissile purposes; transferring ABM
components outside US territory.  Other issues involve the meaning of treaty language:
the Fylingdales and Greenland radar (April 7, 1987) where the meaning of permissible
"modernization" is at issue, and the wide interpretation of Article V of the ABM Treaty,
violation of confidentiality of the SCC.  A further accusation, which the U.S.
acknowledged as a deliberate choice, was the conversion B-52's to carry more cruise
missiles than permitted by SALT II (Dec.8, 1986).  Several other allegations fall into
the category of "undermining," "circumventing" or acting "contrary to the spirit of"
certain agreements, outside our categorization.
noncompliance showed a reasonably similar pattern.7  Uncertainty about the facts of compliance has thus been
significant in prom oting doubts abou t arms treaties.
Many items on lists like these seem rhetorical, and opponents of arms control have sometimes raised
accusations hoping to weaken the agreements.  Their success in generating doubts about treaties shows that
uncertainty in verification has been fundamentally misunderstood.  Uncertainty does not signal that the
provisions a re lax, and  it shou ld no t trigger excessive hindsight abou t how  the treaty  was poo rly nego tiated.  It
can arise from one's prior expectations, and even a  positive quality o f the ve rification system, its deterren t power. 
Effective verification, in proper usage, means that the parties enjoy a high likelihood of accusing if the
other violates and of not accusing otherwise, these two goals being balanced according to the user's values.  The
aim of verification is to deter violations and reduce false alarms, not to provide governments with easier
decisions.  The gist o f this an alysis is  tha t am biguity an d ambivalence are inevitab ly part o f the process . 
14
Appendix 1.  FORMAL STUDIES OF THE VERIFICATION DECISION-MAKING 
The m odel's structure covers each part of the verification decision, and allows us to locate other formal
studies to show how they rela te to each o ther and ultim ately to the po litical dec ision to  com ply or accuse.  I will
include only works that are formal and decision-oriented, that is, only mathematical studies involving
probabilities and co sts.  There have  been surprisingly m any, but often writers were unaware of each other's
research.  Often they did not elaborate on their work's place in the structure of factors leading to a policy decision
about compliance.  
Probability assessment studies
The first group deals with probability assessment, measuring evidence of a violation, and fits in the
"VER IFICATION SY STEM " box of Figure 1.  Some use Bayesian statistics to calculate the strength of evidence
P2`/`P3 directly (e.g., Heckrotte and Moulthroup, 1984; Ciervo and Hall, 1987; Nicholson and Heasler, 1984;
Bryson, 1984).  Other studies use hypothesis testing methods following the logic of classical statistics to derive
only P3 (Hall, Nicholson and Heasler, 1984; Davis, 1984; Shumway and Rivers, 1984; Westervelt, MacKay and
Bryson, 1984; Berg, 1986; Lewis, 1990).  If the value of P3, the evidence given no violation, is low, they
conclude guilt.  This inference is valid only if one regards P2 as substantial and more or less constant with respect
to the evidence -- P3 thus functions as an index for the likelihood ratio P2/P3.  An example would be a one-sided
test of the null hypothesis that a certain explosion had a yield of the treaty limit of 150 kilotons.  Another indirect
way to get at the likelihood ratio would be to find an estimate of the uncertain physical magnitude, and several
studies apply statistical methods of estimation to the problem of explosive yield (Berg and Deemer, 1977; and
Ciervo, Hall and Thomas, 1977).  Again the estimate per se does not give us the likelihood of a violation since an
estimate of, say, 200 kilotons might have arisen by chance from a 150 kiloton explosion, but if one could show
that the variability of the estimation procedure is low, then the likelihood ratio indicating a violation would be
high.  Some studies describe discrimination techniques, e.g., optimal methods for distinguishing earthquakes
from explosions (Douglas, 1981; Tjostheid, 1981.)  Discrimination methods apply to dichotomies (explosion
versus earthquake) whereas estimation m ethods apply to continuous quantities (size of explosion), but o therwise
the  two are alike , and one can  categorize  both as ways to generate indirect ind ices for the  likelihood ra tio P2 /P3.  
Much of the evidence relevant to the value of the likelihood ratio comes from intelligence sources that
cannot be quantified , but formal methods m ay still play  a role.  Th e intelligence analyst m ay have a natural skill
in assessing likelihood s of ind ividual even ts, but no t at articulating them  or combining them .  Probability
assessment methods try to tease the probabilities of elementary events out of the observer so as to construct the
probability of the more com plicated event of interest.  Intelligence agencies curren tly use these m ethods,
although, as one would expect, details are not announced.  One discussion of possible approaches is given by
Cohen, Schum, Freeling and C hinnis  (1985).  
Also within the first group, probability assessment studies, are those that discuss the choice among
different ways of collecting data.  Instead of accepting the data as given and showing how to squeeze maximum
information out of it, these compare different procedures of gathering the data and discuss how to acquire the
necessary evidence for the least cost of collection -- how many units must be observed and in what pattern.  For
example, the problem of verifying quotas, numerical limits on missiles or troops, has been treated by Meyer
(1979), Richelson (1979), DeVolpi (1987), Wittekindt (1984), and Fetter and Rodionov (1991).  Avenhaus (1977,
1986) has published very thorough work on the m onitoring of nuclear materials to prevent diversion to weap onry,
and two papers from the Un ited Nations Conference on Disarmament (Netherlands Delegation, 1984; and Japan
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Delegation, Disarmam ent, 1986) discuss a chemical weapons treaty.  The above studies derive mathem atical
formulae and so consider only a few variables, but complexity can be added and analysed with the help of
computer programs.  Examples are the codes SNAP/D (Ciervo, Sanemitsu, Snead, and Suey, 1980) and
NE TW OR TH , which calculate how much  confidence a certain array of se ismic stations can  convey on the  yield
and  location of  a Soviet nuclear test.
Value Assessment Studies
The second  group , value assessment, tries to determine formally the seriousness of cheating, and thus
these studies lie within the box "OURSELVES" of Figure 1.  The group has meagre representation outside
governm ent agencies .  One  exam ple is Hafem eister's use of  strategic exchange m ode ls (1986) to study the cos t to
the United States of a Soviet treaty breakout.  Alfred Lieberman, as Chief of the Operational Analysis Division of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, surveyed the use of exchange models to estimate the cost of
successfu l violation (1984).  A description  of SIRNEM, a computer code used by the agency for this analysis,
was published by Academ y of Interscience M ethodology (1978).  
Decision Analysis Studies
The third group combines probabilities and values to the observer or inspectee to determine an optimal
inspection  procedure.  They fit in the "O UR SELVES" and  "VERIFICATION SYSTEM" boxes.  Some of these
are detailed interactive computer programs aimed at letting the user explore different schemes.  In the Regional
Seismic Verification System com puter program (Younker et al., 1985; Judd et al., 1986, 1988; Strait and
Sicherm an, 1986; Hannon, 1972), one can al ter assumptions about the verification system an d the other's
motivation to evade.  In the same vein but less complex is Ulvila and Brown's discussion of heuristic rules of
allotting resources in materials safeguards inspection (1981).  Ciervo and Watson (1983) give mathematical
calcu lations  for verify ing a treaty  on in termediate  nuc lear forces and Ciervo (1974 ) discusses the  prob lem  in
regard to a test ban.  Other studies in the decision-theoretic mould investigate seismic identification curves
(Ericsson, 1970; and Weichert and Basham, 1973).  The third group also includes Wiesner curves which describe
how  the requirem ents o f verification grow as the treaty becom es tighter, i.e., sets stronger limits on strategic
weapons (W iesner, 1961; Karkoszka, 1977).  
Game-theoretical Studies 
The final group, the game-theoretical studies, have been more abstract, aimed at elucidating general
principles (Bellany, 1982) or proving theorems.  These involve all the boxes in the diagram.  They differ from the
decision  theory  group  in that each party  makes a  choice that takes into account th e other's thin king and m otives. 
The first studies date from the early 1960's when the test-ban negotiations were reaching an impasse on the issue
of seven yearly inspections, the American  dem and , versus three, the Soviet o ffer.  The great concern at the  time
over the value of each on-site in spec tion w as reflec ted in  the work of three p rom inent game theo rists Haro ld
Kuhn (1963), Melvin Dresher (1962) and Michael Maschler (1966, 1967), who treated very elegantly the problem
of the best use of a quota of inspections.  The Inspector faces the dilemma of expending one inspection from the
quota on a susp icious event knowing that there will then be fewer inspections left  to  deter a violation.  M aschler's
papers showed the  advantages  of having the  inspector m ake an open co mmitment to  a strategy to  the o ther be fore
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     8 Models like Maschler's "price-leadership" model face the problem of threat credibility. 
They imply that the observing government names the threshold irrevocably before
examining the evidence and therefore will sometimes accuse, even when evidence of
violating is so low that the it does not believe the other has violated, and in fact expects
greater benefit by remaining silent and preserving the treaty.  If it can make this threat
credible it will benefit from doing so, but a sensible actor would not deliberately do this
unless there were some mechanism forcing it to keep its commitment.  Unless the
modeller can identify such a mechanism in the political world, it seems safer to do as
the present model has done, to not assume the ability to precommit to actions which at a
future time would be harmful to oneself.  
the evidence is examined.8  Kilgou r and Bram s (1990) expand  on th is them e.  Rap opo rt (1986) gave  a simple
exam ple in  this group.  M oglew er (197 3), Brams, Davis and  Kilgour (1988) and K ilgour (19 90) extend  quo ta
verification theory.  
Other game-theoretical studies have been more abstract, representing the evidence as a single indicator
that alleges "innocent" or "guilty" (Avenhaus and Frick, 1983; Fichtner, 1985, 1986; Dacey, 1979; Wittman,
198 7; W eissenberger, 19 91).  Brams and  his associates have developed  extensively a num ber of such  mode ls
(Bram s, 1985; Bram s and D avis, 1987; B ram s and K ilgour, 1986; B ram s and K ilgour, 1987, 1988). 
Weissenberger's ana lysis (1990) jo intly de termines the theo retically verification  criterion and the op timal treaty
provisions, and in the latter fea ture it steps outside the schem e of F igure 1.  Filar (1983) and Filar and Schu ltz
(1983) treated the case of an inspector who has different travel costs between different sites.  Some recent
sophisticated gam e theo ry work has tu rned  back  to specific contexts, notab ly the m onito ring of m aterials in
nuclear energy plants in support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Avenhaus, 1986; Avenhaus and Canty, 1987;
Avenhaus, Fichtner and V achon, 1987; A venhaus and Zam ir, 1988; Bierle in, 1983; and  Zamir, 1987 .)
Looking at the whole survey points up the lack of studies in the upper righthand box of Figure 1, which
would lo ok at the ve rification question from  the  other side 's point of view. 
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Appendix 2: Derivation of the equilibrium strategies.
To show  that a pair x* and a* is an equilibrium , we mu st show that the Observer has no incentive to move
from x* given the Inspectee uses a*, and we must show the same for the Inspectee with respect to a* and x*. 
Clearly the ex treme strategy x =  0, never accuse , is  not part of an eq uilibrium pair, since the Inspectee's
equilibrium strategy would then be to cheat for any incentive level (i.e., to choose the minimum a *), and the
Observer would have an incentive to always accuse, contradicting the assumption that x = 0.  For analogous
reasons x = 1 cannot be  part of  an equilibrium  pair.  
To examine non-extreme values of x and a as candidates for an equil ibrium, we calculate the two
players' expectations as functions of their strategies and require that they be maximized simultaneously.  The
Observer's expectation EO(x) as a function o f an arbitrary threshold x , given the Inspectee u ses a*, is the value of
the four possible ou tcom es weighted  by their probabilities:
EO(x) / P(NC)P(A*NC) V(A&NC) + P(NC)P(NA*NC ) V(NA& NC ) + P(C )P(A*C) V(A&C) + 
P(C)P(NA*C) V (NA &C ),
where A and C mean accuse and cheat respectively, NA m eans not accuse, etc., and P and V stand for the
probability of the event and the value of the outcome.  Then for x in [0,1]
EO(x) = H(a*)xw +  H(a*)(1-x)t + [1 -H(a*)]f(x)y + [1 -H(a*)][1-f(x)]z.
Since the Observer will maximize this expression with respect to x, then dEO(x)/dx=0 at x=x*.  This,
along with the assumed  differentiability of f, imp lies that the derivative of EO(x) is zero at x=x*:
H(a *)w - H(a*)t + [1-H (a*)]f N(x*)y - [1-H(a*)]f N(x*)z = 0,
yielding H(a*) = f N(x*)/[(t-w)/(y-z) + f N(x)] which in  turn gives 
Given  the Observer uses x*, the Inspectee will choose to maximize 
Th is expression is  the  Inspectee's expectation befo re learn ing the  value a of its m otivation to  cheat. 
Differentiating this expression with respect to a and equating the result to zero gives the value of a at which the
expected  benefit of com plying is just equ al to tha t of violating;
Next we  show  that equations (1) an d (2) have exactly one so lution  for x* in [0,1].  The  procedure is to
show  that (1) defines a* as a continuous and strictly decreasing function of x* and (2) defines it as a continuous
and strictly increasing function of x, then to show that these two curves are positioned such that they cross, and
therefore the two equations have exactly one solution.
Since H(a*) is strictly increasing for non-extreme values of a*, equation (1) defines a* as a function of x*,
wh ich w e will deno te g1(x*), and (2) defines another such  function , deno ted g2(x*).  Since f N is strictly
decreasing, g1  is strictly decreasing, fo r x* in [0,1].  To show that g2 is strictly increasing we calcu late its
derivative , 
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We wish to  show  that the num erator of (3) is positive for x in (0,1).  At x = 0 it is 
b [f N(0) - 1} + c - f N(0)d, which is positive, since f N(0) > 1 and b, c > d, and at x = 1 it equ als 
f N(1)(c - d) which is positive or zero.  To sow that the num erator is positive in between , we examine its derivative
[b(1 - x) +  c - d] f."  The first fac tor m ust be  positive  since b , c > d, and the  second factor f"  is negative for x* in
(0,1).  In all we kno w that the num erator o f (3) is positive at x =  0, decreases strictly  and  continuously as  x goes to
1, and is positive or zero at x = 1.  Therefore (3), the derivative of g2, is positive and g2 itself is strictly increasing,
also con tinuous.
It is easy to check that g1(0) > g2(0) and  that g1(1) < g2(1).  Therefore the two curves cross exactly once,
and  this intersection  gives a strategy pair x* and a* that satisfies (1) and  (2).  These latter equations are necessary
conditions for an  equilibrium  but no t suffic ien t.  We m ust also check tha t the  two expectatio ns are really m axima. 
Their second derivatives indeed turn out to be negative.
Response to an increased cost for violating.
To examine the change in the solution of equations (1) and (2) when we add an increment k to the value
of cheating, we alter A  to A+k an d d to  d+k .  If cheating beco mes m ore costly, as in the  case o f nuclear testing in
rough ocean, then the co rresponding event in  the  model is  k changing from zero to  som e negative  value. 
Equations (1) and (2) can be denoted 
C(x*,a*,k) = 0, D(x*,a*,k) = 0,        (4)
respectively, where
C(x*,a*,k) / (y-z)[1-H (a*)]f N(x*) - (t-w)H(a *),
D(x*,a*,k) / (a*+k)(1-f(x*)) + f(x*)(d+k) + x*c + (1-x*)b + a* + k +  b + f(x *)(d-a*) + x*(c-b ).          
Since the equilib rium  is unique, each value of k  yields a  pair x* and a* so we can regard x* and a* as two
functions of k, which are determined by the equations (4).  The latter can be written,
C(x*(k), a*(k), k) = 0 and D(x*(k), a*(k), k) = 0.
Diffe ren tiating w ith respect to k , using the  chain  rule , 
These are linear equations in dx*/dk and da*/dk, and have solutions,
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We m ay not know the exact values of the derivatives on the righthand side but we can determine their signs by
differentiating (4) and  (5) and  recallin g the assumptions m ade ea rlier  about f, a, b , etc. 
In this case we can derive conclusions about the signs of the values on  the left by substituting signs:
This means that w ith low er k (wh en the test becom es m ore costly), the inspector lowers the threshold, i.e., is
willing to  take less evidence to trigger an  accusation .  Thus when k falls, the threshold m otive fo r chea ting a* rises
and cheating, and the inspectee cheats only at higher levels of motivation.
Thus when  k falls, the thresho ld m otivation for chea ting a* rises, and cheating becomes less likely.
20
     Assumptions on values and expections:
     t = 1 , b, c, w, y  = 0 , d =  z = -1, 












given a guilty indicator
Probability of violation
given an innocent indicator
Observer's expected benefit
befo re observing indicato r 
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    Table 1. A bette r test tha t ind uces m ore  am biguity an d ambivalence when a vio latio n is  detected .  
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